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SECULAR FUNDAMENTALISM, RELIGIOUS
FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA*
Daniel 0. Conkle**
I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every
hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places shall be
made plain, and the crooked places shall be made straight and
the glory of the Lord will be revealed and all flesh shall see it
together.
Martin Luther King, Jr.1
Echoing the prophet Isaiah,2 Dr. King dreamed of societal
harmony and common understanding. Not only would "the glory
* Copyright 1997 by Daniel 0. Conkle.
This article had its origin on October 13, 1994, when I presented informal remarks at
Hamline University's Seventh Annual Symposium on Law, Religion and Ethics. Alan
Freeman and his spouse-collaborator, Elizabeth Mensch, had been scheduled to discuss the
topic of "secular fundamentalism," but Alan had been stricken by the illness that has since
claimed his life, and he and Betty were unable to attend. I and several other panelists
filled in as last-minute substitutes, addressing aspects of the same topic that Alan and Betty
had intended to confront. We filled the time, but we could not begin to replace Alan and
Betty, nor can anyone ever fill the void-both personal and scholarly-that has been
created by Alan's untimely death.
Alan had more to accomplish, but he achieved so much in his life, both individually
and in partnership with Betty. For this we should all be grateful. With sadness but with
abiding respect and admiration, I dedicate this article to the memory of Alan, and I offer it
in tribute to the scholarly work of Alan and Betty alike.
** Professor of Law and Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, Indiana University-Bloom-
ington. I am indebted to Thomas C. Berg, Deborah W. Conkle, Marie A. Failinger, Scott
C. Idleman, Michael J. Perry, and Richard B. Saphire for their extremely helpful comments
on earlier versions of this article.
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (August 28, 1963), reprinted in James
Melvin Washington, ed, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther
King, Jr., at 217, 219 (Harper, 1986).
2. See Isaiah 40:4-5 (King James Version).
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of the Lord" be revealed, but "all flesh" would see the truth to-
gether. In today's America, this vision seems increasingly distant;
some would say increasingly fantastic. From abortion to homosex-
uality to affirmative action, Americans are deeply divided on fun-
damental issues of morality and public policy. Combatants in an
ongoing culture war,3 we disagree not only about specific issues,
but also about the manner in which these issues should be consid-
ered, debated, and resolved. At bottom, we are divided because
we disagree about the nature of moral and political truth and about
how this truth should properly be determined. Far from seeing the
truth together, we see separate truths that emerge from separate
ways of thinking.4
In the epistemic cacophony of contemporary America, per-
haps our most basic dispute concerns the role of religion as a
source of truth.5 In a previous article in this journal, I explored
aspects of this question, focusing on religion's public role, i.e., its
role in American politics and law.6 I argued that religion can and
should play a significant public role,7 but that some types of reli-
3. See, for example, James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America (Basic Books, 1991).
4. Indeed, we cannot even agree on precisely what we mean by "truth." See gener-
ally Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American
Politics 56-62 (Oxford U Press, 1991) (discussing "correspondence" and more "internalist"
understandings of truth). Without entering that debate, I proceed in this article on the
assumption that truth-including moral and political truth-does or might exist in a rela-
tively strong, relatively objective sense, and that the search for truth, so understood, is both
worthwhile and important. This assumption does not presuppose the existence of a single,
universal truth on every moral or political question, regardless of the cultural or historical
context, but it certainly rejects the notion that truth is nothing more than "power" or "so-
cial construction." At the very least, according to my assumption, some arguments on
moral and political matters are better than others and, in that sense, are closer to the truth.
5. Relatedly, there are important epistemological questions concerning the nature
and significance of religious truth, including religious truth as it relates to historical events.
See, for example, Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the
Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels 133-66 (Harper, 1996) (arguing
that the truth of Christianity, including the truth of the Resurrection, is not a matter of
strictly historical inquiry); Howard Lesnick, Religious Particularity, Religious Metaphor,
and Religious Truth: Listening to Tom Shaffer, 10 J Law & Relig 317, 328-30 (1993-94)
(suggesting that religion may be true in a deep but nonhistorical sense, even for those who
are not conventional "believers").
6. Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of
Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J Law & Relig 1 (1993-
94). As Professor David Hollenbach has explained, religion can play a public role not only
by direct involvement in politics, but also by its influence in the broader realm of civil
society and culture. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion:
Civil Society and Culture, 30 San Diego L Rev 877 (1993).
7. The role of religion in politics and law is constrained by the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause's prohibition on religiously moti-
vated policy making is properly limited to the pursuit of spiritual objectives, such as at-
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gion are more valuable for this purpose than others. In part, I of-
fered epistemological distinctions, noting that different religions
recognize different sources of truth and see different roles for argu-
ment and dialogue, both within and outside the community of
believers.8
From this perspective, I was critical of religious "fundamental-
ism," which I defined as a type of religion that regards its sacred
text (or other religious authority) as a source of truth that is abso-
lute, plain, and unchangeable:
This source of truth is absolute in the sense that it cannot be
questioned on the basis of external evidence or arguments. It is
plain in the sense that it requires little if any interpretation. It is
unchangeable in the sense that it need not be adapted to con-
temporary circumstances. 9
Drawing upon democratic ideals that trace their origins to the En-
lightenment and to republican political theory, I contended that
political decisions should be formulated on the basis of a delibera-
tive, dialogic decision-making process, a process that at least per-
mits the possibility that argument or discourse will lead to a change
of mind. Because religious fundamentalism is not willing even to
consider the possible truth of contrary positions, its contributions
to America's public life, I argued, should be viewed with caution
and skepticism. 10
In a footnote to this discussion, I suggested-without elabora-
tion-that secular thinking can take on fundamentalist characteris-
tics and that "the public role of this 'secular fundamentalism'
should also be viewed with skepticism."11 In the current article, I
mean to elaborate on this suggestion. More generally, I intend to
survey several possible meanings of secular fundamentalism and to
suggest how this concept, along with the concept of religious funda-
mentalism, might shed light on the epistemic crisis that confounds
our search for truth-not only on public issues, but in private life
as well. In the course of my discussion, I shall identify the basic
problems that are raised by religious fundamentalism and by secu-
tempts to sponsor prayer or other devotional activities. The Establishment Clause should
not be read to preclude a religiously motivated pursuit of non-spiritual, worldly objectives.
On the distinction between spiritual and worldly objectives, see Conkle, 10 J Law & Relig
at 11-13 (cited in note 6).
8. Id at 13-21.
9. Id at 14. As I explain in the article, fundamentalism actually is a matter of degree;
thus, fundamentalist tendencies may be extreme or more moderate. See id at 14-15.
10. Id at 15-16.
11. Id at 16-17 n 55.
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lar fundamentalism, and I shall explore how we might begin to
move beyond them.
I. THE CONCEPT OF SECULAR FUNDAMENTALISM
Although still uncommon, the phrase "secular fundamental-
ism" has begun to appear with increasing regularity. But what
does this concept mean, or what might or should it mean? I shall
examine four possible meanings, explaining how they might mirror
the meaning of religious fundamentalism and how they might help
us understand the contemporary state of American public and pri-
vate life.
A. Secular Fundamentalism as Ill-Defined Pejorative
Whether applied to religious or secular thinking, the "funda-
mentalist" label carries a pejorative connotation. Often used
loosely and without clear definition, the label can be used to mark
a person, group, or institution as in some respect intolerant, mili-
tant, or otherwise dangerous.
In the religious context, the term increasingly has been linked
to radical movements abroad that are perceived to be not only irra-
tional, but also violent. Professor Arthur Schlesinger Jr., for exam-
ple, associates religious fundamentalism with murderous actions by
people who claim to be following the will of God:
Yigal Amir claims that God ordered him to kill Prime Minister
Rabin. Nor are murderous presumptions of this sort confined to
Jewish fundamentalists. So too Muslim fundamentalists receive
instructions from Allah to kill Salman Rushdie and to plant dy-
namite in Paris subway trains. So too Hindu fundamentalists
massacre Muslims and blow up their mosques. So too Christian
fundamentalists in our own country feel they are serving God by
murdering doctors who perform abortions. 12
Schlesinger finds it "scary" that so many Americans (more than a
third) are "fundamentalists" in the sense that they harbor "delu-
sions" that "God speaks to them directly."' 3 Schlesinger's fear un-
doubtedly is related to the violence that he associates with
fundamentalism: "Fundamentalists are absolutists-people who
believe they are appointed carriers of a sacred gospel and feel so
sure they are right that they have no compunction about killing
12. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Worst Corruption, Wall St J A10 (Nov 22, 1995).
13. Id.
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heretics or doing anything else to advance their cause."14 "Un-
rebuked and unchecked," he concludes, "fundamentalists of all
faiths will continue to believe that they are serving God by may-
hem and murder."1 s
The label "fundamentalist," of course, had its origins in Amer-
ican Protestantism, where it originally was claimed as a matter of
self-description. 16 But views like Schlesinger's are on the rise, es-
pecially in the popular culture. As a result, it is not surprising that
American religious believers, whatever their theology, increasingly
find this label insulting.17
Like its religious counterpart, the phrase "secular fundamen-
talist" often is used to characterize a person or institution as dog-
matic, extreme, or fanatical. Professor Schlesinger, for example,
writes that the fascists and communists of the middle half of the
twentieth century were holders of "totalitarian faiths," "[s]ecular
fundamentalists [who believed they were] executing the will of His-
tory.""8 In similar fashion, Professor Paul D. Carrington has re-
ferred to the violent "secular fundamentalism" of the French
Revolution.19
With reference to contemporary America, the "secular funda-
mentalist" label has been extended to less extreme situations, in-
cluding various types of "politically correct" ideologies or
practices. Professor Carrington, for instance, has suggested that
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of
Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism: 1870-1925 (Oxford U Press, 1980); Ernest R. Sandeen,
The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism 1800-1930 (U Chi-
cago Press, 1970).
17. More and more, conservative American Protestants are calling themselves
"evangelicals." See Gustav Niebuhr, Public Supports Political Voice for Churches, NY
Times Al (June 25, 1996) (describing results of public opinion survey).
18. Schlesinger, Wall St J (cited in note 12). Referring to "the monster of Hitlerism
and Stalinism," Haris Silajdzic, the former Prime Minister of Bosnia, has contended that in
light of this history of "secular fundamentalism," Europeans are in no position to condemn
religious fundamentalism as uniquely problematic. See Premier Warns of Secular Funda-
mentalism in Europe, British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts (July 31, 1995) (available on LEXIS).
19. The French Revolution began with Mr. Jefferson's enthusiastic approval, but
it lost his support when it became infected, as do so many of our causes, with
excessive zeal-when the secular fundamentalists, Marat, Danton, and
Robespierre, guillotined ordinary citizens and even penniless prostitutes on alle-
gations that they had uttered the hateful words, "Vive le roi," or "Long live the
King."
Paul D. Carrington, Remembering Jefferson, 2 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 455, 459 (1993).
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American universities sometimes act as modern-day successors to
the "secular fundamentalists" of the French revolution:20
Many individual members of the academic profession would
punish their students or even their colleagues for utterances that
they choose to deem as offensive, much as Robespierre took
mortal offense at those hateful words, "Vive le roi." In many
places in America, a teacher's career may be placed in grave
danger if he or she is convicted, even in a kangaroo court, of
holding sentiments that are characterized as racist, sexist, or
homophobic, or that are deemed by sensitive auditors to be
"harassment," a term that in some minds embraces all utter-
ances implying sexual differences."1
In like manner, the author of a column in the New York Times has
written that "schools that once believed in free speech, free love,
free everything (but tuition) have turned into bastions of secular
fundamentalism, equally willing to prescribe and proscribe. ' 22 Ac-
cording to Don E. Eberly, this "secular fundamentalism," in
academia and elsewhere, is the work of "secular true believers. 23
As these religious and secular examples suggest, "fundamen-
talism" can carry a powerful rhetorical punch. Absent further clar-
ification, however, there is a significant danger of false association
and exaggeration. As a group, religious conservatives in the
United States certainly are not terrorists in the making,24 and
Robespierre is not lurking behind every campus speech code. In
any event, the term "fundamentalist" does little analytical work
when used as a general pejorative, and it is not particularly helpful
20. Id at 459.
21. Id at 460. See id ("That current academic dogma is secular in form" does not
make it less problematic than religious zealotry.).
22. Allen R. Myerson, Help Wanted: Gyration Inspectors, NY Times Sec 4 at 2 (Feb 4,
1996).
23. Secular true believers, much like their religious counterparts, possess a moral
rectitude that is uncommon in an age of declining beliefs. Secularism's adherents
hold an unshakable confidence not only in the superiority of their values, but to
their right to assert them over others through the institutions of society.
Don E. Eberly, Restoring the Good Society: A New Vision for Politics and Culture 52
(Hourglass Books, 1994).
24. Not surprisingly, this type of false association is likely to be invoked in political
attacks on religious conservatives. For example, Americans United for Separation of
Church and State recently sponsored a political advertisement containing the following
text: "Maybe we should let radical religious fundamentalists run this country. (After all,
it's worked so well in Iran.)" The advertisement ran in the Colorado Springs Gazette Tele-
graph shortly before the November, 1996, election; Americans United was rebuffed in its
attempts to place the advertisement in another newspaper and on billboards. See Barry W.
Lynn, Billboard Battle: Who's Being Censored?, Church & State 21 (Dec 1996).
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in mapping the contours of public and private life in contemporary
America.
Some would argue that "fundamentalist" has become so
freighted with negative baggage and so colored with vague implica-
tions that it should not be used at all. An alternative course is to
use the term more selectively and precisely, indicating the meaning
that is intended and explaining the definitional or analytical work
that is thereby accomplished.25 In my previous article, I attempted
to follow this alternative course in addressing religious fundamen-
talism.26 In the following sections, I shall do the same for secular
fundamentalism, discussing how this concept might have meanings
more helpful than that of a general pejorative.
B. Secular Fundamentalism in Textual Interpretation
As noted earlier, religious fundamentalism can be defined as a
type of religion that regards its sacred text-for example, the Bi-
ble-as a source of truth that is absolute, plain, and unchanging.
As such, religious fundamentalism is one among various methods
of Biblical interpretation. Secular documents also require interpre-
tation and, if the documents carry normative implications, they
may raise similar interpretative issues. In the American political
system, for example, the United States Constitution is a normative
document that embodies a type of political, or perhaps political-
moral, truth. As a result, constitutional interpretation is in some
respects similar to Biblical interpretation.27
"Secular fundamentalism" can be used to describe a method
of secular interpretation that mirrors the method by which reli-
gious fundamentalists interpret the Bible. With reference to the
Constitution, for instance, this form of secular fundamentalism re-
gards the constitutional text as a source of constitutional truth or
meaning that is absolute, plain, and unchanging. To determine the
meaning of the Constitution, one should look only to the text-not
25. The fact that a term has a negative connotation does not necessarily mean that it
should be abandoned. Perhaps the negative connotation is in some way deserved. But this
depends on the particular meaning that the term is designed to convey.
26. Conkle, 10 J Law & Relig at 14-16, 23-24 (cited in note 6).
27. For discussions and evaluations of the analogy between Biblical and constitutional
interpretation, see, for example, Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U
Press, 1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L Rev 1 (1984);
Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convic-
tions into Law, 98 Yale L J 1501, 1509-14 (1989); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S Cal L Rev 551
(1984).
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to societal, philosophical, or other values that lie outside the text.
In this sense, the Constitution, like the fundamentalist's Bible, is an
absolute source of truth. Likewise, one should apply the "plain
meaning" of the constitutional text, which requires little if any ex-
plication, and one should adhere to that meaning as timeless, re-
gardless of changing circumstances or changing values.
"[Constitutional] originalism is secular fundamentalism,"
writes Professor Morton J. Horwitz. 8 Horwitz explains:
To the extent that Constitution worship is America's secular
religion, and all religions have a tendency towards fundamental-
ism, originalism in constitutional discourse is the equivalent of
religious fundamentalism. If you consider the Scopes trial and
William Jennings Bryan's argument for the literalism of the
seven day creation and then think about Justice Black's argu-
ment for the literalism of "Congress shall make no law," you can
see in Justice Black's case a secularized Southern Baptist mode
of argument.
Originalists and constitutional literalists are fundamentalists.
The argument about a living Constitution versus originalism is
parallel to the question of modern and adaptable religion versus
the old time religion.29
Horwitz suggests that America's attraction to what he calls "the
old time religion" helps explain why "the idea of a living Constitu-
tion has had such a difficult time in American culture. 30
Whatever the strength of Horwitz's argument, the concept of
secular fundamentalism can perform a useful function in the con-
text of textual interpretation. Indeed, if religious fundamentalism
is defined as a method of interpretive inquiry, the secular analogy
is very close indeed: both religious and secular fundamentalists
view their normative text as a source of truth that is absolute, plain,
and unchanging."
28. Morton J. Horwitz, The Meaning of the Bork Nomination in American Constitu-
tional History, 50 U Pitt L Rev 655, 663 (1989).
29. Id (footnote omitted). Compare McConnell, 98 Yale L J at 1512 (cited in note 27)
("Constitutional interpretation, performed in the manner of Orthodox Jews and Christian
fundamentalists, would seek specific answers to specific questions from a particular time in
the past (presumably the founding), and would enforce those answers in today's world,
notwithstanding considerable pressure arising from changes in context and circum-
stance."). See also Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, New York
Review of Books 33, 39 (Feb 18, 1988).
30. Horwitz, 50 U Pitt L Rev at 663 (cited in note 28). For further elaboration, see
Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv L Rev 30 (1993).
31. Secular fundamentalists, at least if they are judges, actually might have a more
complex understanding of the text they are interpreting. In particular, judges might adopt
[Vol. XII
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Although interesting and helpful, the idea of secular funda-
mentalism as a form of textual interpretation is limited to its partic-
ular context, i.e., the interpretation of normative secular texts, of
which the Constitution is the prime example. The question that
remains is whether there are other forms of secular fundamental-
ism in contemporary America, forms of secular fundamentalism
that may have broader, more general implications for the search
for truth in American public and private life.
C. Secular Fundamentalism as Political Liberalism
Religious fundamentalism is more than a method of textual
interpretation. It also reflects unquestioning faith. This faith re-
quires no reasoned explanation, and it need not be defended
against challenges that proceed from contrary premises. Viewed in
this way, religious fundamentalism can be seen as a method of
thought that is both insulated and insular; it is insulated from com-
peting claims of truth, and it inhabits an epistemic universe that is
disconnected from other ways of thinking.
Is there a comparable type of secular thinking, i.e., a "secular
fundamentalism" that depends on faith, that shields itself from in-
compatible truth claims, and that effectively isolates itself as a sep-
arate system of thought? With respect to American politics and
public life, at least, one could argue that there is, and that it takes
the form of political liberalism (in the philosophical sense).
Needless to say, there are various theories of political liber-
alism. In general, however, liberalism calls for public "neutrality"
toward the "private" moral choices of individuals, a neutrality that
is said to require the exclusion of "personal" moralities, including
religious viewpoints, from any significant role in public policy mak-
ing.32 Thus, according to liberalism, we are to "bracket our moral
a fundamentalist interpretive stance without rejecting the possibility that the text, in its
fullest understanding, contains broader or evolving truths. In interpreting the Constitu-
tion, for example, judges might believe that the judiciary should do no more than enforce
the Constitution's fundamentalist meaning, but they might also believe that nonjudicial
decision makers, interpreting the Constitution for themselves, might properly honor other,
non-fundamentalist constitutional values.
32. According to Professor Michael J. Sandel, this ideal of neutrality is one of three
connected ideas that form the essence of contemporary liberal theory, the others being the
priority of individual rights and the notion that individuals are "freely choosing, unencum-
bered selves." Together they create what Sandel describes as "the procedural republic" of
modern America. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a
Public Philosophy 28 (Belknap Press of Harvard U Press, 1996).
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and religious convictions when deliberating about politics and
law. " 3 3
Although different theories contain important variations and
qualifications, 34 an essential claim of liberalism is that political de-
cisions generally should be supported by "reason," and that reli-
gious and similar viewpoints do not qualify. Professor John
Rawls, for example, privileges what he calls "public reason" :36
What public reason asks is that citizens be able to explain their
vote to one another in terms of a reasonable balance of public
political values, it being understood by everyone that of course
the plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by citi-
zens is thought by them to provide further and often transcen-
dent backing for those values. ["Comprehensive doctrines," for
Rawls, include religious and similar belief systems. 37] . . . The
only comprehensive doctrines that run afoul of public reason are
33. Id at 18. Some contend that political liberalism, and the privileging of secular over
religious beliefs in the resolution of political issues, is constitutionally required by the Es-
tablishment Clause. For a prominent article advancing this position, see Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195 (1992). As noted previously, I
reject this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, which, in my view, would improperly
constrain the religiously motivated pursuit of non-spiritual, worldly objectives. See above,
note 7.
This is not to deny that a religiously motivated law, like any other law, might violate
constitutional principles-or principles of liberal democracy-that are unrelated to the
law's religious motivation. See generally John H. Garvey, A Comment on Religious Con-
victions and Lawmaking, 84 Mich L Rev 1288 (1986) (arguing that liberal democracy val-
ues certain goods, including certain individual freedoms, and that religiously motivated
lawmaking should not conflict with those goods); John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms
For? (Harvard U Press, 1996) (elaborating Garvey's theory of freedoms).
34. Professor Mark Tushnet, for example, has argued that it is permissible for
lawmakers to rely on religious justifications, but only if the laws they adopt are indepen-
dently justifiable on secular grounds. Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Reli-
gion in the Body Politic, in James E. Wood, Jr., and Derek Davis, eds, The Role of Religion
in the Making of Public Policy 191-220 (Baylor U Press, 1991). Professor Michael J. Perry
adopts a somewhat similar position in his most recent book, although he would not require
secular grounding for the claim that all human beings are sacred. Michael J. Perry, Reli-
gion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives (Oxford U Press, 1997).
35. Indeed, liberal theorists may define "reason" to include virtually all kinds of think-
ing except religion. According to Professor Suzanna Sherry, for example, "reason" in-
cludes thinking based on "experience, observation, logic, learned patterns, and
tradition"-unless, that is, any of these sources of judgment depend upon "[a]ppeals to a
perception of reality shared only by the faithful." Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84
Georgetown L J 453, 455-56 (1996).
36. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia U Press, 1993). Rawls limits his claim
to "fundamental" political questions involving "constitutional essentials" and "questions of
basic justice," id at 214, although he adds that even with respect to other issues, "it is
usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public rea-
son," id at 215.
37. See id at 13, 175.
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those that. cannot support a reasonable balance of political
values.38
As this passage suggests, the related concepts of "public reason"
and "reasonable balance" are at the core of Rawls' theory.
According to Professor Paul F. Campos, however, Rawls' ex-
planation and defense of these concepts is seriously incomplete.
Indeed, says Campos, Rawls' vision of liberalism amounts to a type
of "secular fundamentalism. '39 According to Campos, "'reason'
and 'reasonable' fill the lexical space that in many other discourses
would be filled by 'God,' or 'the scriptures,' or 'moral insight.'...
'[R]eason' functions as the master concept that transcends the
enumeration of particular reasons: invoking 'reason' becomes
equivalent to giving reasons."40 And to invoke "reason" is to ex-
clude conceptions of truth that, according to "reason," are not
"reasonable." In this way, Campos concludes, Rawls and his fol-
lowers can "celebrate tolerance and pluralism while at the same
time condemning any meaningful dissent ... as not merely wrong,
but contrary to the dictates of reason itself. 41
To the extent that political liberalism-whether that of Rawls
or that of other theorists-in fact embraces an exclusive and exclu-
sionary form of "reason," it, like religious fundamentalism, is both
insulated and insular. It is insulated from claims of truth that lie
outside the domain of reason, and it inhabits an epistemic universe
that is disconnected from these other ways of thinking. To the ex-
tent that liberalism cannot defend its embrace of reason except by
averting to reason itself, moreover, it requires a leap of faith. In
38. Id at 243. Although he privileges public reason in this sense, Rawls contends that
citizens who affirm his understanding of liberalism do so "on moral grounds." Id at 147.
All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own compre-
hensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it pro-
vides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those grounds
does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or moral, as the
case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of their
affirmation.
Id at 147-48. For Rawls' most recent explication of his views, see John Rawls, The Idea of
Public Reason Revisited, 64 U Chi L Rev 765 (1997).
39. Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 Colum L Rev 1814 (1994). Compare
R. Randall Rainey, S.J., Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 Loyola LA
L Rev 147, 189-90 (1993) (suggesting that "the systematic exclusion or marginalization of
'religious people' from public policy discourse and the rule of law" amounts to "'liberal
fundamentalism,"' a "form of secular fundamentalism").
40. Campos, 94 Colum L Rev at 1820-21 (cited in note 39).
41. Id at 1826.
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this sense, it may be that liberalism is "the faith of those who have
lost their faith. 42
Secular fundamentalism, understood as the embrace of polit-
ical liberalism, rejects religion as a source of truth in the public
domain.43 To the extent that religion has truth value, it is a matter
of private truth, a form of truth that lacks public significance. In
the public sphere, reason prevails. Modern science is one aspect of
reason; it controls the resolution of empirical questions. On ques-
tions of morality and ethics, secular rationalism is controlling, and
"private" moral choices are protected in the absence of tangible
and demonstrable harm to others.44
This understanding of secular fundamentalism helps explain
the public aspects of modern America's epistemic crisis. On one
side are religious fundamentalists who, assuming they bring their
religion to bear on public issues, regard it as the only legitimate
source of truth on whatever issues it addresses. On the other are
secular fundamentalists who embrace an entirely different source
of truth, one that excludes religious thought as illegitimate. Each
group resides in its own world of truth. These worlds are isolated
from each other, and their inhabitants cannot communicate across
the divide.
D. Comprehensive Secular Fundamentalism
Secular fundamentalism as political liberalism is limited to the
public sphere. But some secular thinkers-let us call them "com-
prehensive secular fundamentalists"-embrace a similar epistemol-
ogy for all questions of truth or meaning. Thus, comprehensive
secular fundamentalists resolve public and private questions of
42. Id at 1822.
43. At least one political candidate has used the phrase "secular fundamentalism" in
this way. See John Marelius, Huffington Issues Spiritual Call to Arms, San Diego Union-
Tribune 8 (Oct 12, 1994) (quoting United States Senate candidate Michael Huffington as
decrying the "secular fundamentalists" who believe that "God should ... be kept in the
closet and under wraps" and that religion should not be brought to bear on public issues).
44. On the privatization of religion and the secularization of public debate, see, for
example, Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion (Basic Books, 1993); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Some Political
Implications of Religious Belief, 4 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol'y 419, 421-27 (1990);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va L Rev 671 (1993);
Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in
the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L Rev 163; Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Reli-
gious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U Pa L Rev 149, 169-78 (1991). For a rich
analysis of these developments as they relate to the issue of abortion, see Elizabeth
Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Is Abortion Debatable? (Duke U Press,
1993).
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truth exclusively by reference to modern science and secular ra-
tionalism.45 Other potential sources of truth, including especially
religion, are excluded from consideration.
As Reinhold Niebuhr observed, secularism can lead to a type
of "fanaticism" that "insinuates new and false ultimates into views
of life which are ostensibly merely provisional and pragmatic. 46
Comprehensive secular fundamentalists may well adopt a provi-
sional and pragmatic view of reason. Ironically, however, it is their
very embrace of reason, as an exclusive and exclusionary source of
truth, that serves as their false ultimate, i.e., as opposed to the ulti-
mate of truth itself. With reason as their ultimate value, compre-
hensive secular fundamentalists virtually close their minds to
religious insights, and therefore to the possibility of religious truth
or meaning, whether in public or in private life. Thus, like religious
fundamentalists, they are absolutists in the sense that they are un-
willing even to consider claims of truth that proceed from premises
they do not already share.
This more comprehensive understanding of secular fundamen-
talism may be the one that most closely mirrors religious funda-
mentalism, whose claims of truth, of course, apply to matters of
private as well as public concern. Otherwise, the comparison is
similar to that which I have offered concerning the public domain.
Thus, as applied in a comprehensive manner to private and public
issues alike, religious and secular fundamentalism are systems of
thought that are both insulated and insular-that is, both shielded
and isolated from competing understandings of truth. Likewise,
each depends on a type of faith. The faith of religious fundamen-
talists is the acceptance of truths without regard to competing
claims of reason; the faith of comprehensive secular fundamental-
ists is that without reason, there is nothing.
No less than the versions of secular fundamentalism discussed
previously, comprehensive secular fundamentalism is a concept
that helps illuminate America's chaotic search for truth. Compre-
hensive secular fundamentalists follow an epistemology that sepa-
45. Comprehensive secular fundamentalists invariably embrace political liberalism for
the resolution of public questions. Conversely, those who are secular fundamentalists in
the sense of embracing political liberalism need not be comprehensive secular fundamen-
talists, i.e., they need not reject religion as a source of truth or meaning in the private
domain.
46. Reinhold Niebuhr, 2 The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Destiny 238
(Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) (originally published 1943); see Thomas C. Berg, Church-
State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 NC L Rev 1567, 1603-06
(1995).
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rates them, on private as well as public issues, from those who
regard religion as at least a potential source of truth or meaning.
Religious fundamentalists are equally isolated, ignoring claims of
truth that might undermine their religious understandings.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FUNDAMENTALISM
In examining our epistemic struggles in public and private life,
the most useful understandings of secular fundamentalism are the
last two offered: secular fundamentalism as political liberalism and
comprehensive secular fundamentalism. In the remainder of this
article, I shall focus on secular fundamentalism in these two senses,
along with religious fundamentalism as applied to public and pri-
vate issues respectively. I shall identify what I regard as the basic
problems with religious and secular fundamentalism, and I shall
suggest, in tentative and exploratory fashion, how we might begin
to move beyond them.
A. The Problems with Religious Fundamentalism
in Politics and Law
In my previous article, I addressed the problems that arise
when religious fundamentalism-reliance on a religious source of
truth that is viewed as absolute, plain, and unchanging-is brought
to bear on political or legal issues. 47 To summarize briefly, the
American political system has intellectual roots in reason as well as
religion. These roots derive from the Enlightenment, which taught
that religion is not beyond the testing of reason, and from republi-
can political theory, which emphasized the importance of delibera-
tion in the formulation of government policies.
These themes of the Enlightenment and of republicanism con-
tinue to inform our system of governance. When religious funda-
mentalism enters the realm of politics and law, however, it rejects
the claims of reason and relies on a source of truth that is beyond
challenge or debate. This type of political involvement thus tends
to undermine a basic tenet of our democratic system-that legal
policies should be formulated on the basis of a dialogic decision-
making process, a process requiring an openness of mind that reli-
gious fundamentalism does not allow.
47. See Conkle, 10 J Law & Relig at 14-16, 23-24 (cited in note 6). No less than other
citizens, religious fundamentalists are entitled to the full protection of our constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom and freedom of expression. Thus, in suggesting that reli-
gious fundamentalism can be problematic in the realm of politics, I certainly am not sug-
gesting that it should in any way be legally restricted or legally disadvantaged.
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It is important to emphasize that these problems are distinc-
tive to religious fundamentalism; they do not extend to religion in
general. Too often, this distinction is overlooked. Professor
Suzanna Sherry, for example, invokes the continuing lessons of the
Enlightenment and republican theory to support her argument that
religious beliefs should be excluded from any meaningful role in
public policy making.48 But Sherry reaches this conclusion only by
confusing religion with religious fundamentalism, i.e., by assuming
that all religion is fundamentalist religion. Thus, she refers to reli-
gion as an "antirational" epistemology that is "likely to be impervi-
ous to persuasion."4 9 "Sincerely held religious beliefs," she writes,
"cannot be shaken by rational argument-that is the heart of
faith. 50
Contrary to Sherry's suggestion, religious beliefs can be the
product of rational thinking no less than of faith. To be sure, faith
is a critical part of religion. More to the point, this faith is typically
grounded in a sacred text that serves as an important source of
truth, one that may be at odds with competing secular sources.
Unless they are fundamentalists, however, religious believers do
not view their sacred text as a source of truth that is absolute, plain,
and unchanging.5 1 Thus, non-fundamentalists interpret their text
not according to a perceived "plain meaning," but rather with an
eye to competing sources of truth, including modern science and
philosophy.52 Likewise, they consider the changing condition of
society for its impact on their religious understandings.
Accordingly, non-fundamentalist religious believers form and
revise their beliefs, including their religious beliefs, by considering
48. See Sherry, 84 Georgetown L J at 464-84 (cited in note 35).
49. Id at 478-79.
50. Id at 476. But compare id at 454 (contrasting "largely rational" religion with "re-
ligiosity of the traditional, pre-Enlightenment, antirational kind").
51. In my previous article, I distinguished between two types of non-fundamentalist
religious believers-religious "modernists," who stand at the opposite extreme from reli-
gious fundamentalists, and religious "reconcilers," who stand more in the middle. See
Conkle, 10 J Law & Relig at 17-21 (cited in note 6). In the present discussion, I am treat-
ing these two types together.
52. Contrast Sherry, 84 Georgetown L J at 462 (cited in note 35) ("The methods of
science and rational argument are of no avail in evaluating religious beliefs .... ).
Writing from a very different perspective, Professor Stanley Fish challenges the coher-
ency and persuasiveness of liberal arguments like that of Sherry. See Stanley Fish, Mission
Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 Colum L Rev 2255
(1997). But Fish, like Sherry, appears to believe that religious thinking is truly "religious"
only when it amounts to religious fundamentalism: "[T]hose religions that put 'openness
of mind' at the center of their faith-or rather at the center of their rejection of faith-...
are indistinguishable from other enlightenment projects and are hardly religions at all." Id
at 2281.
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not only their religious text, but also contemporary societal prac-
tices and various kinds of nonreligious thought. In so doing, they
constantly strive to maintain an overall belief structure that is logi-
cal and coherent.53 Hardly "impervious to persuasion," they are
broadly open to rational dialogue, both within and outside their
religious community. As a result, when non-fundamentalist reli-
gious believers bring their religious beliefs to bear in American
politics and lawmaking, this practice does not conflict with the in-
sights of the Enlightenment and republican theory. The conflict
arises only if the religious believers are religious fundamentalists.
B. The Problems with Religious Fundamentalism in
the Private Domain
In the private domain, the problems with religious fundamen-
talism are not political, but theological. I am not a theologian, but
these problems are basic, and they therefore are not difficult to
recount. They involve the undervaluation of human reason, the sin
of intellectual pride, and the lack of genuine religious faith.
Religious fundamentalism does not deny the human capacity
to reason, but it strictly limits the role of reason by affirming a
source of truth that is regarded as absolute, plain, and unchanging.
On whatever issues this source of truth addresses, reason is thus
confined within a narrowly drawn and self-contained epistemic sys-
tem. As a result, religious fundamentalism severely cabins, and
thereby undervalues, the human capacity for reason. Yet this ca-
pacity for reason, no less than the human capacity for faith, is a
product of the Creation, and therefore should be accepted as a gift
from God.
Religious fundamentalism also is theologically problematic in
its claims of certitude. These claims suggest the sin of pride-in
particular, the sin of intellectual pride, or pride of knowledge.54
At the same time, they are premised on an unwillingness to con-
front competing evidence and arguments, an insular stance that,
paradoxically, suggests a lack of genuine religious faith.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, a contemporary Christian theologian, is
critical of fundamentalist religion, by which he means "religion
53. For a wonderful description of the "continuous" epistemology of a religious be-
liever of this type, see Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemol-
ogy, 30 San Diego L Rev 763, 767-70 (1993).
54. For a discussion of the sin of intellectual pride, i.e., pride of knowledge, see Rein-
hold Niebuhr, I The Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Nature 194-98 (Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1964) (originally published 1941).
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that, in an unwarranted claim to certitude, refuses to engage the
human capacity for reason."55 He writes that authentic religion
must "lay claim to reason" and at the same time "be ready to ac-
cept criticism, and to cultivate an ethos of self-criticism. ' 56 Pan-
nenberg explains:
Traditional doctrines and forms of spirituality, along with the Bi-
ble itself, are not exempt from critical inquiry. Such inquiry is
required by the alliance of faith and reason. Christian confi-
dence in the truth of God and His revelation should be vigorous
enough to assume that truth will not succumb to any findings of
critical inquiry .... [I]f we think it is necessary to protect di-
vinely revealed truth from critical inquiry, we are in fact display-
ing our unbelief. Such inquiry, while it may at times pose
difficulties, will finally enhance the splendor of the truth of
God.57
Religious fundamentalists can lead lives that are rich in mean-
ing and that are grounded in a deep sense of order as well as peace.
But their religion rests on a theology that is problematic in signifi-
cant respects. A more satisfying theology suggests that religion
should fully accept and embrace the gift of human reason. It
should engage competing claims and arguments, holding fast to a
faith that such discourse will not and cannot undermine the truths
of God.
C. The Problems with Secular Fundamentalism in the Form of
Political Liberalism
In the public sphere, secular fundamentalism, in the form of
political liberalism, is problematic for reasons that are similar to
those relating to political decision making based on religious fun-
damentalism. Thus, like religious fundamentalist politics, liber-
alism-to the extent that it precludes religious involvement in
politics-is inconsistent with the political foundations of our soci-
ety as well as our contemporary political culture; More specifi-
cally, the historical and contemporary role of religion in American
public life belies the claim of liberalism that citizens and lawmakers
should "bracket" their religious convictions when deliberating
about politics and law.
55. Wolfhart Pannenberg, How to Think About Secularism, First Things 27, 31 (June/
July 1996).
56. Id.
57. Id at 31-32.
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As noted previously, the American political system has roots
in reason,58 but it also has roots in religion. As Professors Richard
Vetterli and Gary C. Bryner have explained, the Founders were
overwhelmingly religious, and they did not regard religion as irrel-
evant to public issues:
The Founders as a whole were deeply religious men. Religion
played a vital role in most of their lives; it influenced their be-
liefs and activities, their ideals and hopes. The foundation of
their modern republican philosophy was based on a belief in
God. Whatever the concepts that blended to form this republi-
can doctrine-the dignity of man, natural law, natural rights, the
right of resistance-all were suffused with an aura of the
sacred.59
Like many Enlightenment thinkers, the Founders-most of them,
at least-regarded revelation as an important supplement to rea-
son.60 In their minds, religion and reason played complementary
roles in the search for truth, including political truth.61
In the protection of religious freedom itself, for instance, reli-
gious justifications played a central role in the founding period-in
58. See above, note 47 and accompanying text.
59. Richard Vetterli and Gary C. Bryner, Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of
the American Republic, in Neil L. York, ed, Toward A More Perfect Union: Six Essays on
the Constitution 91, 100 (Brigham Young U, 1988).
60. James Madison, for example, "arrived at a consistent, lifelong defense of Christian-
ity on the basis both of reason and intuition, shifting gradually like many contemporaries
from the first to the second." Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America 96 (Oxford U
Press, 1976). As such, Madison's beliefs fell at "the center of the American religious spec-
trum." Id; see also id at xiv.
61. Professor Suzanna Sherry contends otherwise, but her argument is unpersuasive.
Sherry initially claims that "virtually all of the Framers-and indeed the entire founding
generation-shared a common background in the epistemology of the Enlightenment," an
epistemology "based on reason and empiricism, specifically rejecting faith and revelation."
Sherry, 84 Georgetown L J at 466 (cited in note 35). She then concedes, however, that her
claim is "clouded" by the fact. that "[t]he question of whether to privilege faith or reason
would not have occurred to the founders for the simple reason that they did not see them
as in conflict. They believed that religious belief could be (and indeed should be) sup-
ported by principles of reason." Id at 468. Sherry concludes that "the founding generation
subscribed to the epistemology of reason," id, but the better conclusion, even by Sherry's
own account, is the one that I advance in the text. In particular, the evidence suggests that
the founding generation's understanding of the Enlightenment did not deny a role for reli-
gion, i.e., as long as the religion did not conflict with the teachings of reason.
Relying on their own historical claims, Professors Isaac Kramnick and R. Lawrence
Moore have argued that the Framers created "a godless Constitution and a godless poli-
tics," and that this understanding should continue to control today. See Isaac Kramnick &
R. Lawrence Moore, The Godless Constitution: The Case Against Religious Correctness 22
(W.W. Norton & Co, 1996). As Professor Scott C. Idleman has powerfully demonstrated,
however, the authors' thesis is seriously flawed and cannot be accepted. See Scott C. Idle-
man, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American Constitutionalism, 71 Notre
Dame L Rev 991 (1996).
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the arguments "not only of ministers and religious leaders, but also
of political leaders such as Madison and Jefferson. ' 62 In particular,
Madison relied on religious arguments in his Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments.63  And Jefferson
grounded his famous Virginia Act for Religious Freedom on an ex-
plicitly religious rationale. Thus, in its preamble, the Act declares
that "Almighty God hath created the mind free" and that com-
pelled religion is "a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of
our religion, who, being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not
to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty
power to do."164
The Founders' views concerning the public relevance of reli-
gion have never been abandoned. Rather, history reveals that
Americans, time and again, have brought their religious convic-
tions to bear on important questions of public policy-on issues
such as slavery, temperance, civil rights, immigration, poverty,
abortion, and environmental policy.65 This is hardly surprising, be-
cause the most common American religions have significant polit-
ical implications. As Dean M. Kelley has noted, "the formative
religious traditions of the Western world-Judaism and Christian-
ity-have for millennia embraced the conviction that their religious
duty entailed active intervention in the 'body politic.' 66 As a re-
sult, Kelley writes, "churches and synagogues can no more be silent
on public issues than human beings can refrain from breathing."67
Liberalism's attempt to exclude religion from any role in pub-
lic policy making might be plausible as a matter of abstract political
philosophy, and it might even be plausible for some democratic so-
cieties. To make valid claims on the actual workings of a particular
society, however, a political theory cannot dishonor that society's
62. Smith, 140 U Pa L Rev at 162 (cited in note 44); see id at 153-66; see generally
Symposium, Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism, 39 Emory L J 1 (1990).
63. For a discussion of Madison's arguments, see Smith, 140 U Pa L Rev at 161 (cited
in note 44).
64. Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va Code Ann § 57-1 (Michie 1996) (enacted
Jan 16, 1786); see Smith, 140 U Pa L Rev at 162 (cited in note 44).
65. At the very least, this historical and continuing pattern of religious involvement
suggests that "those who seek to secularize entirely the political and legal processes ought
to face a presumption not in their favor." Scott C. Idleman, The Sacred, the Profane, and
the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief, 142 U Pa L Rev 1313, 1339
(1994).
66. Dean M. Kelley, The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic,
in Wood and Davis, eds, The Role of Religion in the Making of Public Policy at 159, 168
(cited in note 34).
67. Id at 188. See also Perry, Love and Power at 77-82 (cited in note 4) (discussing the
"essentially political" nature of religion, including especially Western religion).
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history, its contemporary political culture, and the fundamental be-
liefs of its citizens. As Professor Thomas C. Berg has written, "reli-
gion is too pervasive a factor in the lives of Americans" as well as
"their concrete, historic patterns" to support a theory that pro-
ceeds "on the hope or premise that it will go away or retreat to the
margins of life."6 8 Berg relies on the insights of Reinhold Niebuhr:
[S]ecularization of the public order goes hopelessly against the
grain in any society, such as America, in which religion plays an.
important role in the lives of the people. Niebuhr's increasingly
Burkean, "organic" understanding of society emphasizes that
government must arise from the people, from their concrete,
historic patterns. It cannot be based on imposing an abstract
and ideologically consistent scheme-in this case, the rigid sepa-
ration of religion from public moral reasoning-in the name of
liberal philosophy . ... 69
In the "incurably religious" United States,7 ° at least, the claims of
political liberalism ring hollow and cannot be accepted.
Republican theory does not suggest otherwise. From a histori-
cal perspective, republicanism's search for the public good cer-
tainly did not exclude religion. In the founding period, as
Professors Vetterli and Bryner have argued, "[r]eligion was espe-
cially important to the development of a republican culture,"71 with
religious (including especially Christian) values and insights play-
ing prominent and substantial roles:
The general Judeo-Christian tradition permeated American life.
There were strong sentiments of mission, a belief that this pris-
tine land had been set apart and preserved for a chosen people,
and faith that America "was not only a destined nation, but a
redeeming nation." There was a general consensus that Chris-
tian values provided the basis for civil society. Religious leaders
had contributed to the political discourse of the Revolution, and
the Bible was the most widely read and cited text. Religion, the
Founders believed, fostered republicanism and was therefore
central to the life of the new nation.72
68. Berg, 73 NC L Rev at 1607 (cited in note 46).
69. Id.
70. See id. For a summary of statistics concerning the religiosity of Americans, see
Conkle, 10 J Law & Relig at 3-4 (cited in note 6).
71. Vetterli and Bryner, Religion, Public Virtue, and the Founding of the American
Republic at 92 (cited in note 59).
72. Id (footnote omitted); see id at 91-117; see also Richard Vetterli & Gary C.
Bryner, In Search of the Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government
(Rowman & Littlefield, 1987).
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After the founding, moreover, religion continued to be "the major
carrier of this republican tradition. '73 Thus, as Professor John A.
Coleman has explained, "the strongest American voices for a com-
passionate just community always appealed in public to religious
imagery and sentiments, from Winthrop and Sam Adams, Melville
and the Lincoln of the second inaugural address, to Walter Raus-
chenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr and Frederick Douglass and
Martin Luther King."
74
According to Coleman, the historical link between republican-
ism and American religion is hardly surprising, and it is a link with
continuing relevance:
Both the tradition of republican theory and that of biblical reli-
gion place great stress on love and sacrifice for the common
good and on the need to found the health of public life on indi-
vidual virtue and a morally good citizenry. Both stand in judg-
ment of social theories which expect public virtue to arise from a
healthy compromise of private vices.75
Professor Timothy L. Hall concurs, noting that "[r]eligious groups,
in the form of voluntary associations, create a context in which in-
dividuals become sharers of a common life, and thus have occasion
to acquire an other-regarding disposition. '76 Moreover, Hall con-
tinues, religious groups "have traditionally preserved didactic re-
sources for discourse concerning the common good. The major
religions, for example, have each emphasized perspectives that
temper, at least to some degree, the purely selfish impulses that
war against a concept of the public good."77 As Coleman and Hall
make clear, religion has the capacity to advance, not hinder, a re-
publican search for the common good.
From both a historical and a contemporary perspective, more-
over, there is no reason to assume, a priori, that religion-at least
non-fundamentalist religion-cannot use this capacity in a manner
that contributes to a dialogic, deliberative truth-seeking process.
As explained earlier, religious believers can be broadly open to ra-
tional discourse, not only within their religious community, but also
in the broader culture.78 As a result, Professor Michael J. Perry's
73. John A. Coleman, An American Strategic Theology 187 (Paulist Press, 1982).
74. Id at 193.
75. John A. Coleman, A Possible Role for Biblical Religion in Public Life, 40 Theologi-
cal Studies 701, 702 (1979).
76. Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67
Tulane L Rev 87, 110 (1992).
77. Id at 111.
78. See above, text accompanying note 53.
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conclusion is sound: "[A]t its best," writes Perry, "religious dis-
course in public culture is not less dialogic-not less open-minded,
not less deliberative-than is, at its best, secular discourse in public
culture.
79
In addition to its problematic character in the public domain,
political liberalism has potentially damaging spill-over effects on
the private sphere of life. In theory, liberalism does not deny the
truth and value of religion on issues of private concern. In prac-
tice, however, to the extent that we exclude religion from public
life, we suggest that religion is a second-class source of truth. As
Wolfhart Pannenberg explains, "People need social support in
holding that a given account of reality is plausible."8 Pannenberg
cites the work of sociologist Peter L. Berger, who has described
religious believers in the modern world as a "cognitive minority,"
i.e., "a group of people whose view of the world differs significantly
from the one generally taken for granted in their society. ' 81 For
such a group, according to Berger, "the plausibility of 'knowledge'
that is not socially shared, that is challenged by our fellow men, is
imperiled, not just in our dealings with others, but much more im-
portantly in our own minds."82
I doubt that religious believers are a "cognitive minority" in
the contemporary United States, but the devaluing of religion in
public life could eventually place them in a comparable predica-
ment. In particular, a rigidly secular public culture-a culture of
the sort that liberalism might promote-would provide no social
support for religious beliefs. Instead, it would tend to undermine,
indirectly but inevitably, even the private faith of religious
believers.83
79. Perry, Religion in Politics at 46 (cited in note 34). Perry adds the following, paren-
thetical comment: "Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more monologic-more close-
minded and dogmatic-than is, at its worst, secular discourse." Id at 46-47.
Focusing on fundamentalist religion and citing psychological and sociological factors,
Professor William P. Marshall has argued that religious involvement in politics creates a
special risk of intolerance. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 Hastings L
J 843 (1993). Whatever the strength of Marshall's claim, however, it certainly cannot be
extended to non-fundamentalist religion.
80. Pannenberg, First Things at 27 (cited in note 55).
81. Peter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the
Supernatural 6 (Anchor Books, 1990).
82. Id at 7.
83. See Gedicks, 4 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol'y at 432-39 (cited in note 44).
But compare Theodore Y. Blumoff, The New Religionists' Newest Social Gospel: On the
Rhetoric and Reality of Religions' "Marginalization" in Public Life, 51 U Miami L Rev 1
(1996) (arguing that the privatization of religion does not imply its marginalization, and
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D. The Problems with Comprehensive Secular Fundamentalism
Secular fundamentalism in another form, i.e., comprehensive
secular fundamentalism, is directly relevant to the private sphere.
As discussed previously, comprehensive secular fundamentalism
moves beyond political liberalism to a more complete rejection of
religious ways of thinking.84 Thus, it turns to modern science and
secular rationalism for the resolution of all questions of truth,
whether public or private, and regardless of whether the questions
relate to matters of fact or matters of value.
From the perspective of comprehensive secular fundamental-
ism, science is controlling on questions of fact. Science also plays
an important, albeit more subtle, role in resolving questions of
value. Thus, with its emphasis on empiricism and objectivity, the
scientific world-view supports the idea that moral duties do not
arise in the absence of tangible, observable harm to others. It is a
combination of science and secular rationalism, then, that supports
the idea of personal autonomy: in the absence of tangible, demon-
strable harm to others, all questions of morality-whether public
or private-should be left to the autonomous decisions of
individuals.
Due especially to its heavy reliance on science, comprehensive
secular fundamentalism also supports the idea of naturalism. Nat-
uralism is "the view that ultimately nothing resists explanation by
the methods characteristic of the natural sciences. ''8 5 According to
naturalism, human attitudes and behavior, like other phenomena,
are the product of prior causes that themselves are subject to scien-
tific examination and explanation. Thus, "along with the rest of
nature, human beings are explainable through the methods of the
natural sciences. Human institutions and practices, the modes of
experience of men, the goals and values of individuals and groups,
are all natural, and no less so than the wheeling of galaxies and the
evolution of species."86
Naturalism promotes the belief that what we think and do are
entirely the product of naturalistic causes, i.e., primarily genetics
and social conditioning. Many psychologists, for instance, now
that, indeed, there is an over-abundance of public religiosity in the United States, which
actually disserves the cause of true religion).
84. See above, Part I. D.
85. Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 255 (Oxford U Press,
1994).
86. Arthur C. Danto, Naturalism, in Paul Edwards, ed, 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy
448, 449 (Macmillan Pub Co & Free Press, 1972).
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claim that human happiness "seems to be largely determined by
the genes, not by outside reality. '87 This kind of scientific deter-
minism in turn promotes a sense of moral relativism. If human
attitudes and values are nothing more than the product of prior,
scientifically identifiable causes, how can one say that the values
that some people display are morally superior to the values dis-
played by others? Indeed, naturalism leaves us in a universe that
"has no moral character save to the extent that it contains human
beings among its objects and thus contains entities that have and
pursue values."88
Comprehensive secular fundamentalism thus supports and fur-
thers the ideas of personal autonomy, naturalism, and moral rela-
tivism. In the end, however, these three ideas are fundamentally
inconsistent. In particular, naturalism and moral relativism se-
verely undermine the value of personal autonomy. Consider, for
example, a young woman deciding the future direction of her life.
She might pursue a college education and eventually a career as a
doctor. Instead, she might delay college-perhaps forever-in or-
der to wed her high school sweetheart and start a family, or in or-
der to take a job at a local factory. Or she might become a
member of a religious order, taking a vow of chastity and poverty,
and devoting her life to hands-on service to the poor. Or she might
pursue any of a number of other options. Needless to say, the
young woman's decision is laden with moral considerations, and,
according to the principle of personal autonomy, she is "free" to
make this decision for herself. But just what is the point if her
"choice," in reality, is nothing more than the product of naturalistic
87. Daniel Goleman, Forget Money; Nothing Can Buy Happiness, Some Researchers
Say, NY Times B5 (July 16,1996). According to Dr. David T. Lykken, any deviations from
this genetic predisposition depend primarily upon "the sorrows and pleasures of the last
hours, days or weeks." Id (quoting Dr. Lykken). But "[h]owever tragic or comic life's ups
and downs, people appear to return inexorably to whatever happiness level is pre-set in
their constitution." Id.
According to this theory, to actively seek happiness, i.e., a personal "sense of well-
being," is an uphill struggle at best. See id (quoting Dr. Lykken). But according to Dr.
Lykken, the cause is not entirely hopeless. He offers this advice:
Be an experiential epicure. A steady diet of simple pleasures will keep you above
your set point. Find the small things that you know give you a little high-a good
meal, working in the garden, time with friends-and sprinkle your life with them.
In the long run, that will leave you happier than some grand achievement that
gives you a big lift for awhile.
Id (quoting Dr. Lykken). It is difficult to imagine a thinner understanding of human fulfill-
ment and human autonomy.
88. Danto, 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy at 449 (cited in note 86). See generally Phil-
lip E. Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law &
Education (InterVarsity Press, 1995).
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causes, and if no particular decision is any better than another?
Autonomy becomes an illusion, and moral relativism sinks into the
abyss of moral emptiness.
Like the problems with religious fundamentalism in the pri-
vate domain, the problems with comprehensive secular fundamen-
talism are essentially theological. To accept the theological critique
of comprehensive secular fundamentalism, however, one need not
adopt any particular religious viewpoint. One need only believe
that human life has ultimate meaning and purpose, i.e., that human
life is more than the product of naturalistic-and essentially
amoral-causes.
As Professor Michael J. Perry has explained, the essence of
religion-and therefore theology-is the affirmation that human
life has ultimate meaning. "One polar response to the problem of
meaning," writes Perry, "is to conclude that life is, finally and radi-
cally; meaningless .... 89 The other polar response, he continues,
"is 'religious': the trust that life is ultimately meaningful, meaning-
ful in a way hospitable to our deepest yearnings." 90 My argument
here is that anyone accepting the second response should reject the
comprehensive form of secular fundamentalism. 91
Beyond theology, moreover, comprehensive secular funda-
mentalism is problematic on its own terms. As I have just dis-
cussed, the three major ideas that it supports are actually in
conflict. Yet there is an even more basic problem of internal incon-
sistency. Above all else, comprehensive secular fundamentalism
purports to privilege reason. But reason requires a certain open-
ness of mind, a willingness to confront competing evidence and ar-
guments. Those who adhere to comprehensive secular
fundamentalism, however, are absolutists in at least one respect:
they are not open to the possibility of religious truth and therefore
are not willing to consider arguments that depend upon religious
perspectives. To this extent, then, comprehensive secular funda-
mentalists actually ignore the cardinal value that they claim to pre-
fer, the value of reason itself.
89. Perry, Love and Power at 69 (cited in note 4).
90. Id at 70.
91. It may be that many who regard themselves as "secularists" would accept the sec-
ond response. If so, they may be more "religious" than they think.
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III. MOVING BEYOND FUNDAMENTALISM: TOWARD A
DIALOGIC, MULTI-LINGUAL SEARCH FOR TRUTH
Both in the public and in the private domain, the claim that
fundamentalism is detrimental to the search for truth depends
upon the belief that dialogue is beneficial. Thus, if dialogue sup-
ports the search for truth, fundamentalism-whether religious or
secular-is problematic because it entails a method of thinking that
categorically denies the legitimacy or value of insights that proceed
from contrary premises. As such, it is not open to a dialogic search
for truth, at least not outside the confines of its self-contained epi-
stemic system.
But perhaps dialogue is not important, or at least not essential,
in the pursuit of truth.92 Whether on issues of public or of private
concern, perhaps it is enough that individuals can join in common
cause when their goals or interests coincide. In the public domain,
for example, religious and Secular environmentalists-without the
need for any meaningful discourse between them-might combine
to provide sufficient political support for an environmental statute
that each group finds desirable, albeit for radically different rea-
sons. Fastidious political liberals might object even to this type of
religious-secular alliance. Otherwise, however, the idea of com-
mon cause would permit fundamentalists of all stripes, both reli-
gious and secular, to determine their own truth in their own way
and, on public questions, to vote for the policies and the candidates
that they believe their truth to require.
If dialogue in fact facilitates the search for truth, however, as I
believe it does, fundamentalism-whether religious or secular-
works to hinder that search. It erects a type of linguistic barrier,
one that frustrates the search for truth by inhibiting communica-
tion that might lead to that end. Fundamentalists are like English
speakers who adopt an "English only" rule for a society that in-
cludes people who speak not English, but Spanish. Perhaps the
fundamentalists, like the English speakers, will reach the truth
even as they exclude the views of those who use another language,
92. As Professor Steven D. Smith has noted, the role of dialogue in the search for
truth can be overstated. See Steven D. Smith, Moral Realism, Pluralistic Community, and
the Judicial Imposition of Principle: A Comment on Perry, 88 Nw U L Rev 183,186 (1993)
("Moral reality... may be best understood not through dialogue or theoretical discourse,
but rather by other means or faculties such as intuition, inspiration, tradition, or revela-
tion."); Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression,
60 S Cal L Rev 649, 690 (1987) ("The suggestion that dialogue is the exclusive method of
ascertaining truth does violence to the very meaning of dialogue. By its nature, dialogue is
inherently parasitic upon methods other than dialogue for discovering truth.").
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but surely the odds would be improved if everyone's arguments
and insights could be considered.
For a speaker's arguments and insights to be considered, of
course, his or her listeners must be able to comprehend the
speaker's language. To answer this need, some have argued that, at
least in the public sphere, we should prefer a common language
that is secular.9 3 Thus, like Spanish speakers in an English-speak-
ing society, religious citizens should translate their religious argu-
ments into secular terms. Professor Suzanna Sherry, for example,
writes that "[p]ublic dialogue... is only possible where the partici-
pants speak the same language, and in political discourse, speaking
the same language is analogous to Rawls's 'public reason.' ' 94
In a society as religious as ours, however, perhaps the secular
speakers-at least those who embrace "public reason" as their ex-
clusive mode of public discourse-are the ones speaking Spanish.
In any event, the historical and contemporary role of religion in
American public life makes it difficult to accept the argument that
we should privilege secular language, and therefore secular think-
ing, in the manner suggested by Sherry and other liberal theorists.
And in private life, there is even less reason to prefer discourse
that is secular as opposed to religious.
More generally, it would be wrong-in public or private life-
to adopt a single and exclusive moral language, whether secular or
religious in nature. To do so would be to deny to some speakers
their moral language of choice, a language that is closely linked to
their sense of self, to the core of who they are as individuals. Those
whose moral language is excluded would suffer affront, if not hu-
miliation, because the exclusion would deny an essential element
of their humanity. It would treat them as second-class citizens, sec-
ond-class human beings. Their pain and resentment, in turn, would
have adverse consequences for society at large, producing deep-
seated divisions, distrust, and conflict.95
93. See, for example, Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obli-
gations of Citizenship, 18 Phil & Pub Aff 259 (1989); Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus,
Talking Politics, 92 Colum L Rev 954 (1992); Marshall, 44 Hastings L J 843 (cited in note
79).
Professor Kent Greenawalt has advanced a series of sophisticated and nuanced argu-
ments that point generally in this direction, but with significant exceptions and caveats.
See, for example, Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford U
Press, 1988); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford U Press,
1995).
94. Sherry, 84 Georgetown L J at 471 (cited in note 35).
95. Compare Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause,
82 Nw U L Rev 1113, 1164-69 (1988) (arguing that a failure to respect religious and irrelig-
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At the same time, limiting discourse to a single moral language
would artificially confine and constrain the search for truth. A
richer discourse-and a more open search for truth-would not be
confined to a single moral language. Focusing especially on. the
need to respect religious contributions to public dialogue, Profes-
sor Stephen L. Carter explains:
What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout
choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liber-
alism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a
member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity
of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly
not abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen,
not because the speaker has the right voice but because the
speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the willingness to lis-
ten must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying some-
thing worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that
shape the moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans.96
Although directed to the public sphere, Carter's observations can
properly be extended to support a multi-lingual dialogue on public
and private issues alike. In such a dialogue, secular speakers could
speak their language of choice, but so, too, could religious
speakers.
For the multi-lingual discourse to be fully successful, however,
participants would need to learn and understand the moral lan-
guages being used by others, and they themselves would need to
communicate in moral languages other than their own. This might
mean religious thinkers communicating not only in the language of
their own religious traditions, but also in that of others. At least in
the private domain, this type of interreligious communication al-
ready occurs with some degree of frequency. Thus, as Professor
Theodore Y. Blumoff has argued, "conversation is not only possi-
ble across denominations, it occurs all the time. '97 Professor
Blumoff, who is Jewish, provides a personal example, explaining
ious beliefs can cause grave injury, not only to the individuals whose fundamental beliefs
are being disparaged, but also to the larger community of which those individuals are a
part).
96. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief at 230-31 (cited in note 44) (emphasis in original).
Compare Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv L Rev
2061, 2077 (1992) ("Why doesn't liberal democracy give everyone an equal right, without
engaging in any version of epistemic abstinence, to make his or her arguments, subject,
obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the arguments should they be unpersua-
sive ... ?").
97. Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J Law & Relig 591,
610 (1994-95).
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how he has conversed with a Mormon colleague: "I question him
using the same logic and language he uses. I question him in terms
of his beliefs, as he does of mine."98 On public issues as well, there
is no reason to doubt the efficacy of this sort of discourse. On the
issue of capital punishment, for example, Professor Martin E.
Marty, an old-line Protestant, recently has invoked the principles
of more evangelical thought in an attempt to persuade Charles
Colson, an evangelical Protestant, that the death penalty is im-
moral "in evangelical terms."99
In the multi-lingual discourse that I envision, religious thinkers
might communicate not only in the language of their own and
other religious traditions, but also in secular language. I must con-
cede that it can be difficult for religious believers to translate their
religious arguments into secular terms,100 and the secular transla-
tion is likely to miss important parts of the religious meaning.
Even so, as Professor Blumoff argues, "religiously motivated con-
victions usually can be meaningfully if not always fully translated
into secular language."'' 1  And this would not be a one-way street.
Thus, in the multi-lingual discourse, secular thinkers might some-
times speak in religious terms, thereby communicating with reli-
gious believers in part by translating their secular arguments into
language that the religious believers might find more persuasive.
Indeed, as Professor Thomas C. Berg has suggested, it may be that
the best form of argument, at least in many situations, appeals "to
a standard that citizens on the other side of the debate accept. 10 2
"[B]y presenting arguments based on premises others can accept,"
98. Id.
99. Martin E. Marty, Dear Charles Colson . Christian Century 799 (Aug 14-21,
1996).
As Professor Douglas Sturm has argued, the serious pursuit of interreligious dia-
logue-a dialogue that "celebrates difference" even as it affirms "connectedness"-may
represent a productive response to "the political question," i.e., the question of "How shall
we live our lives together?" Douglas Sturm, Crossing the Boundaries: On the Idea of Inter-
religious Dialogue and the Political Question, 30 J Ecumenical Studies 1, 2, 3 (1993). Com-
pare Alesia Maltz, Commentary on the Harris Superquarry Inquiry, 11 J Law & Relig 793,
831 (1994-95) ("[E]cumenical approaches are one of the most important tools we have to
integrate values into political discourse.").
100. See Richard B. Saphire, Religious People and Public Life: Some Reflections on
Greenawalt, 23 N Ky L Rev 655, 680 (1996) (asking devout religious believers to recast
their arguments in nonreligious terms can be like asking them "to recast their arguments in
ancient Greek").
101. Blumoff, 11 J Law & Relig at 611 (cited in note 97). Compare Mary Ann Glen-
don, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 181-82 (Free Press, 1991) (dis-
cussing the possibility of "translating" particular religious discourses without a loss of
religious distinctiveness).
102. Berg, 73 NC L Rev at 1622 (cited in note 46).
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Berg writes, "the citizen respects the limits of her own perspective
and the goodness and truth in those of others. "103
For the benefit of those who might think otherwise, it is im-
portant to emphasize the positive role that religious language-and
religious insights-can play in a multi-lingual, dialogic exchange.
As Professor John A. Coleman has written, for religious thinkers to
limit themselves entirely to secular language creates a serious risk
that "the specifically theological or religious vision will be under-
mined, betrayed or distorted. ' 10 4 Religious language, for example,
can convey a communitarian impulse that is not easily captured in
secular terms. The power of religious symbolism can "stir human
hearts and minds to sacrifice, service, and deep love of the commu-
nity. ' ' 10 5 The "thin" language of secularism, by contrast, tends to
perpetuate "the bias toward liberty at the expense of justice in the
American public-philosophy tradition and its concomitant individ-
ualistic tone. '10 6 Professor Michael J. Perry agrees, noting that
religious insights can be meaningful even to those who stand
outside the religion in question. "You certainly do not have to be
Jewish to recognize that the prophetic vision of the Jewish Bible is
profound and compelling," he writes, "any more than you have to
be Catholic or Presbyterian or Baptist or even Christian to recog-
nize that the Gospel vision of what it means to be human is
profound and compelling.' 0 7 As Perry suggests, religion can move
us to confront the ultimate questions of private and public life. In-
deed, it can move us to address the very meaning of human life,
both for individuals and for the political community of which they
are a part.
Although the insights of religion would be important and valu-
able in the multi-lingual discourse that I envision, no language,
whether religious or secular, would receive an a priori advantage.
In the public domain, the goal would be similar to that of the "ecu-
menical politics" that Professor Perry has advocated:
The aim of ecumenical politics is, in words borrowed from The
Williamsburg Charter, "neither a naked public square where all
religion is excluded, nor a sacred public square with any religion
established or semi-established." The aim, rather, "is a civil
103. Id. Berg's points are directed to the public sphere, but they are equally valid for
discourse and debate in the private realm.
104. Coleman, An American Strategic Theology at 195 (cited in note 73).
105. Coleman, 40 Theological Studies at 706 (cited in note 75).
106. Id at 705.
107. Perry, Religion in Politics at 81 (cited in note 34). "Gandhi was not a Christian,"
Perry continues, "but he recognized the Gospel vision as profound and compelling." Id.
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public square in which citizens of all religious faiths, or none,
engage one another in continuing democratic discourse.
10 8
Whether in public or in private, moreover, every insight, religious
or secular, would be considered for the light it might shed and the
wisdom it might contain. 10 9
The search for truth thus would be guided not by power,110 but
by persuasion. As Professor Sherry writes, "moral reasoning ...
can be good or bad."11' Although Sherry limits herself to secular
moral reasoning, her analysis actually applies to religious reasoning
as well. Thus, moral reasoning, whether secular or religious,
can be good or bad. It can contain inconsistencies and failures
to notice logically necessary connections. It can fit poorly with
experience or with one's other beliefs, or have unpalatable im-
plications. It can be based on faulty premises, unchallenged
only because of cognitive negligence. 2
Conversely, it might be logical. It might fit well with one's exper-
iences. It might mesh with one's other beliefs or lead to an adjust-
ment of those beliefs. Its implications might be attractive, and it
might rest on premises that are sound.'13
Would the language of fundamentalism, at least, be properly
excluded from the multi-lingual discourse? Although it may seem
paradoxical, the answer is no. Although I have argued that funda-
108. Perry, Love and Power at 45 (cited in note 4) (quoting The Williamsburg Charter:
A National Celebration and Reaffirmation of the First Amendment Religious Liberty
Clauses 19 (1988)).
109. In my previous article, I urged religious thinkers to be "reconcilers," thinkers will-
ing to confront and consider secular as well as religious sources of truth in an attempt to
"reconcile" these sources by bringing them into harmony or agreement. Conkle, 10 J Law
& Relig at 19-21 (cited in note 6). Those whose starting point is secular could likewise be
reconcilers in this sense. To be a reconciler, however, one first must be multi-lingual: one
cannot meaningfully consider a potential source of moral truth without understanding and
communicating in the moral language of that source.
110. But compare Sherry, 84 Georgetown L J at 477 (cited in note 35) ("[T]here is no
way to resolve disputes between epistemologies except by recourse to power.").
111. Id at 474.
112. Id at 474-75 (footnotes omitted).
113. See generally Alexander, 30 San Diego L Rev 763 (cited in note 53) (arguing for
the unity of religious and nonreligious epistemology).
At least on one theoretical understanding, the First Amendment, taken as a whole,
may support my general conception of the search for truth. Thus, according to Professor
William P. Marshall, the search for truth is a value that helps justify not only freedom of
expression, but also the Religion Clauses. William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion
Clauses, 43 DePaul L Rev 243 (1994). "[B]y affirming the value of religious ideas in the
pursuit of truth," writes Marshall, "the search for truth value recognizes that freedom of
religion and freedom of speech are complementary parts of the same enterprise." Id at
267. For an elaboration of Marshall's views, see William P. Marshall, In Defense of the
Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 Ga L Rev 1 (1995).
337]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
mentalism frustrates a dialogic search for truth, this occurs only to
the extent that fundamentalists actually control the discourse or
make the decisions that the discourse is designed to inform. Such
control or such decision making, in my view, would indeed be
problematic. In the public domain, for example, it would be prob-
lematic if fundamentalists had the strength of numbers and the
political power to themselves determine our laws and policies. But
fundamentalists certainly can play a "speaking" role in the search
for truth. Fundamentalists, as listeners, may be unwilling to enter-
tain non-fundamentalist positions, but that does not mean that
their fundamentalist claims have no value in a discursive exchange
with non-fundamentalists. To the contrary, non-fundamentalists
should listen to fundamentalist claims, attempting to understand
the premises on which they are based and to appreciate the truth
they might contain. At the same time, at least if my arguments in
this article are sound, non-fundamentalists should urge their funda-
mentalist interlocutors to reconsider their fundamentalist stance.
Fundamentalist minds can be changed-albeit only by conversion
to non-fundamentalism.
In the world of multi-lingual discourse that I have imagined,
humility and tolerance would be exceedingly important. 14 In
America, however, these qualities could and should be supported
by religious as well as Enlightenment values," 5 including, in the
words of Reinhold Niebuhr, the religious "sense of humility which
must result from the recognition of our common sinfulness. 1 1 6
"To subject human righteousness to the righteousness of God,"
writes Niebuhr, "is to realize the imperfection of all our perfec-
tions, the taint of interest in all our virtues, and the natural limita-
tions of all our ideals."' 17
Professor Thomas C. Berg explains the significance of
Niebuhrian humility in the realm of politics:
The Niebuhrian view asks the political activist (religious or secu-
lar) not to renounce his most basic views, but to be aware of
114. This humility and tolerance would require that full consideration be given to the
experiences, values, and insights of religious minorities, whose historical and contemporary
experiences may lead them to be concerned, if not frightened, about an enhanced religious
role in contemporary America. For powerful testimony on this concern from a Jewish
perspective, see Blumoff, 11 J Law & Relig (cited in note 97).
115. See Berg, 73 NC L Rev at 1624 (cited in note 46).
116. Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, eds, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Polit-
ical Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age as Expressed in His Writings 207 (Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1960).
117. Id.
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several complicating factors: his own limits, the difficulty in ap-
plying general religious truths to complex real-world problems,
and the potential good and truth in the views of his
opponents.
118
Needless to say, Niebuhr's vision of humility-and the tolerance it
naturally inspires-could and should extend to the private sphere
as well.
CONCLUSION
Martin Luther King, Jr., dreamed of societal harmony and
common understanding, a time when "all flesh" would see the
truth together.' 19 My dream is more modest: a multi-lingual
search for truth that might be a step in that direction. In today's
America, even my dream-not to mention Dr. King's-might ap-
pear to be quite unrealistic. 120 As King most powerfully showed,
however, dreaming is not always a vice, and "realism" is not always
a virtue. Undue "realism" can block the pursuit of dreams that are
118. Berg, 73 NC L Rev at 1624 (cited in note 46). "Religious humility," according to
Niebuhr, "is in perfect accord with the presuppositions of a democratic society." Reinhold
Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy
and a Critique of its Traditional Defence 135 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944).
As Professor Jaroslav Pelikan has noted, President Abraham Lincoln exemplified the
type of humility that Niebuhr later described. Jaroslav Pelikan, Believers-in-Chief, New
Republic 30, 32 (Sep 4, 1995). Thus, Lincoln showed "a sense of reverence in the presence
of a divine mystery that did not yield its ultimate secrets either to rationalism or to ortho-
doxy and therefore called for humility and awe on the part of all mortals." Id.
119. See above, notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
120. And even if my proposed search for truth were in fact pursued within the United
States, this might not be adequate for the increasingly global era in which we live. Accord-
ing to Professor Harold J. Berman, international conditions require "a transnational, cross-
cultural, inter-religious" search for truth. Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DePaul L
Rev 143, 164 (1994). Such a search, writes Professor Berman, would draw upon
the resources not only of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-the traditional theistic
religions-but also of various forms of Buddhism, Taoism, and other non-theistic
religions, as well as on various forms of humanism that are not called religions but
share with them a passionate commitment to a higher spiritual truth.
Id at 157.
If my dream for the United States is unrealistic, all the more so is Berman's for the
world. But Berman has hope even for his vision, hope he traces to the Biblical account of
Pentecost:
Implicit in the story of the Tower of Babel is the story of Pentecost .... It tells us
that at a place where a multitude of people of different nationalities had gathered
to worship, certain of them received from the Holy Spirit the power to speak in
"other languages," so that all the peoples of the earth could hear "the mighty
works of God," "each in his own native tongue." Thus the story of Pentecost
gives hope that human pride can be overcome, and that by translation from one
language to another all peoples of the world may, by the power of a higher spiri-
tual truth, share each other's experiences vicariously and become, as they were
originally intended to be, united.
Id at 165 (citing and quoting Acts 2:1-13).
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difficult but worthy. Such dreams demand our energetic support,
however distant and unlikely their ultimate achievement might
seem.
Dr. King not only pursued his "unrealistic" dream; he had
faith that it would become a reality. "With this faith," he said, "we
will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope.
With this faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of
our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood."'2 1
Perhaps we cannot muster the faith of Dr. King. But if not
faith, let us at least have hope.
121. King, I Have a Dream at 219 (cited in note 1).
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